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ABSTRACT 
The authors describe and explore changes in the dissociative disorders included in the new DSM-III-R. The classification 
itself was redefined to minimize inadvertant areas of overlap with other classifications. Recent findings have necessitated substan-
tial revisions of the criteria and text for multiple personality disorder. Ganser's Syndrome, listed as a factitious disorder in DSM-
III, is reclassified on the basis of recent research as a dissociative disorder not otherwise specified. The examples for dissociative 
disorder not otherwise specified have been expanded to better accommodate recognized dissociative syndromes that do not fall 
within the four formally defined dissociative disorders. Several novel diagnostic entities and reclassifications were proposed that 
were rejected for DSM-III-R because there is insufficient supporting data at this point in time. These proposals identify issues that 
will require reconsideration for DSM-JV. 
The Advisory Committee on the Dissociative 
Disorders was one of several such committees convened 
by the Work Group to Revise DSM -III to review the 
DSM III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) clas-
sifications, criteria, and texts in the light of interim 
clinical experience and scientific findings, and recom-
mend such changes as seemed warranted. Its members 
included Bennet G. Braun, M.D., Philip M. Coons, M.D., 
Richard P. Kluft, M.D., Frank W. Putnam, M.D., Robert 
L. Spitzer, M.D., Marlene Steinberg, M.D., and Janet 
B.W. Williams, D.S.W. This paper explores the issues 
considered by that committee and the reasoning that led 
to the revisions decided upon. The Dissociative Disor-
ders are described on pages 269-270 of DSM-III-R 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987) and on pages 
253-260 of DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 
1980). In deference to considerations of readability, this 
article will allow the preceding complete citations to 
stand in the stead of innumerable virtually identical 
references that are made to both DSM-III and DSM-III-R 
throughout its text. 
DESCRIYTION OF THE 
DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS 
For reference purposes, the DSM-III-R Dissociative 
Disorders text is given, with intercalated parenthesized 
numbers to indicate the locations of Significant changes 
from DSM-III that are discussed below: "The essential 
feature of these disorders is (1) a disturbance or altera-
tion in the normally integrative functions of identity, 
memory, or consciousness (2). The.disturbance or 
alteration may be sudden or gradual, and transient or 
chronic (3). If it occurs primarily in identity, the 
person's customary identity is temporarily forgotten, 
and a new identity may be assumed or imposed (as in 
Multiple Personality Disorder), or the customary feeling 
of one's own reality is lost and replaced by a feeling of 
unreality (as in Depersonalization Disorder). If the 
disturbance occurs primarily in memory (4), important 
personal events cannot be recalled (as in Psychogenic 
Amnesia and Psychogenic Fugue). Depersonalization 
Disorder has been included in the Dissociative Disorders 
because the feeling of one's reality, an important compo-
nent of identity, is lost. Some, however, question this 
inclusion because disturbance of memory is absent. 
Although Sleepwalking Disorder has the essential 
features of a Dissociative Disorder, it is classified as a 
Sleep Disorder (5)." 
ISSUES AND RESOLUTIONS 
(1 and 3) DSM-III had specified that dissociative 
disturbances or alterations were sudden and temporary. 
In fact, a thorough review of the classic and recent 
literature (Kluft, 1988) indicates that gradual or stepwise 
onsets are known, and that two Dissociative Disorders, 
Multiple Personality Disorder and Depersonalization 
Disorder, as well as several forms of Dissociative 
Disorder not otherwise Specified (NOS), commonly may 
run a chronic course, straining the connotation if not the 
denotation of "temporary." These two adjectives had 
often been used to distinguish Psychogenic Amnesia 
from organic memory disorders, but are misleading with 
regard to other disorders in this group. 
(2) DSM-III had listed "consciousness, identity, or 
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DSM-III-R 
motor behavior."(p. 253). This wording had inadver-
tantly a) deemphasized the importance of amnesia in 
this group of disorders, and b) by including motor 
behavior in this manner (although subsequent text 
references clarified that what was meant was the action 
performed during a disturbance of consciousness and/ 
or identity), the wording had made it possible to con-
sider Conversion Disorder a Dissociative Disorder, a 
stance for which arguments can be made. It will remain 
for future scientific investigators to reassess which 
course is preferable: to hew to a definition of dissocia-
tion that suggests that Conversion Disorder falls within 
the dissociative spectrum, or to use a more limited 
definition of dissociation. In the interim, the potential for 
confusion suggested the revisions adopted. 
(3) V.S. 
(4) The Omission of the crucial role of amnesia in 
the DSM-III introduction is redressed by the inclusion of 
this specific reference. 
(5) DSM-III-R has reclassified Sleepwalking Disor-
der as a Sleep Disorder, necessitating a text change. 
THE SEQUENCE OF THE DISORDERS 
DSM-III-R reverses the order in which Multiple 
Personality Disorder, PsychogeniC Fugue, and Psycho-
genic Amnesia were described in DSM-III. This reflects 
an increased awareness that Multiple Personality 
Disorder is in many ways both the paradigm and the 
most pervasive expression of the spectrum of dissocia-
tive phenomenology. 
MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER 
Overview 
DSM-m serendipitously coincided with the publi-
cation of six major articles on Multiple Personality 
Disorder (Bliss, 1980; Braun, 1080; Coons, 1980; Greaves, 
1980; Marmer, 1980; Rosenbaum, 1980). Within a few 
years a disorder thought to be rare, apocryphal, or even 
extinct emerged as a long neglected, underdiagnosed, 
and frequently misdiagnosed condition, highly associ-
ated with significant childhood traumatization, and 
rather responsive to intensive (and often long-term) 
psychotherapy. Many patients long thought to have 
other disorders and relatively unresponsive to the 
therapies appropriate for those disorders have proven to 
have this condition. Putnam, Guroff, Silberman, Barban 
and Post (1986) found that 100 Multiple Personality 
Disorder patients had averaged 6.8 years between their 
first mental health assessment for problems referrable to 
this condition and their receiving an accurate diagnosis; 
during this period they had received an average of 3.6 
erroneous diagnoses. KIuft (1985) reviewed the longitu-
dinal histories of over 200 such patients and was able to 
construct a "natural history' of Multiple Personality 
Disorder. Although this disorder remains controversial, 
the emerging literature, summarized in recent reviews 
(KIuft, 1987a, 1987e) clearly has demonstrated the need 
to revise many long-held beliefs about this condition an 
its manifestations. DSM-III-R moved to incorporate the 
most robust of the recent findings. 
CRITERIA 
The DSM-III criteria are: "A. The existence within 
the individual of two or more distinct personalities, eacl 
of which is dominant at a particular time. B. The person 
ality that is dominant at any particular time determines 
the individual's behavior. C. Each individual personal-
ity is complex and integrated with its own unique 
behavior patterns and social relationships (p. 259)." ~ 
These criteria were reasonable and straightforward 
given the data base available at the time (the late 1970s), 
but are oversimplistic and misleading in the context of 
current knowledge. Their literal interpretation and 
application introduces a strong albeit inadvertent bias 
toward false negative diagnosis. 
Criterion A mistakenly implies that at any given 
time, one personality is dominant. In fact, periods of 
mixed, shared, contested, or rapid and unstable alternat 
ing dominance are commonly seen in many cases. 
Criterion B is potentially confusing. The personality that 
appears to be dominant and may represent itself as 
dominant may in fact be strongly influenced by another, 
of whose influence it mayor may not be aware. One 
ironic outcome of these circumstances is that Multiple 
Personality Disorder patients who are able to give an 
accurate account of their subjective experience of these 
processes may appear to violate the diagnostic criteria of 
this disorder even as they offer a classic description of its 
phenomena in action. A second is that the personalities' 
experiences of one another's impact may take the form 
of hallucinations, illusions, and passive influence 
experiences, leading the clinician to believe that they 
suffer a psychotic or borderline condition (KIuft, 1987b). 
Criterion C is problematic. The degree of elaboration 
and complexity of the separate entities has proven to be 
an expression of the interaction style of the personalities, 
the structure of the dissociative defenses, overall adap-
tive patterns, and character style of the individual 
patient rather than a core criterion of the illness. For 
example, a patient may have such extensive dividedness 
that this criterion is not fulfilled, the personalities may 
find it adaptive to pass for one another in social circum-
stances, the personalities may choose to influence one 
another covertly without emerging, a high-functioning 
patient may restrict the personalities' overt emergence to 
private moments, a creative person Il')ay apply that 
creativity to the elaboration of the personalities while a 
less creative one may not, etc. The Committee took note 
of the fact that the publicity accorded to certain patients 
with this disorder who are quite creative has unduly 
influenced clinicians' expectations about this population. 
I 
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All three criteria suffer from problems with the 
term "personality." Although this term is a traditional 
usage, its employment in this context is confused by its 
different meanings within the literature of the mental 
health sciences. The Committee considered adopting 
Braun's (1986a, 1986b) nomenclature for the quantifica-
tion of the degree of elaboration of the personalities, but 
decided to incorporate the thrust of his observations 
without introducing a novel set of terminology as well. 
In brief, Braun observed that personalities differed 
widely in the degree to which each had a firm sense of 
self, a characteristic pattern of behavior and responses, a 
range of functions, a range of emotions, and a Significant 
life history of its own existence. DSM-III-R acknowl-
edges this spectrum by indicating that the patient may 
have "personalities" or "personality states," but adopt-
ing the use of "personality" throughout the text. The 
issue is further complicated by KIuft's (1985a) longitudi-
nal studies, which documented that many personalities 
were not rigidly consistent, but both evolved and 
changed over time. 
Reflecting the above considerations, the DSM-III-R 
criteria become: "A. The existence within the person of 
two or more distinct personalities or personality states 
(each with its own relatively enduring pattern of per-
ceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment 
and selO. B. At least two of these personalities of person- ) 
ality states recurrently take full control of the person's 
behavior." The "spectrum" issue is addressed further in 
the elaboration of Dissociative Disorder NOS to include: 
"cases in which there is more than one personality state 
capable of assuming executive control of the individual, 
but not more than one personality state is sufficiently 
distinct to meet the full criteria for Multiple Personality 
Disorder, or cases in which a second personality never 
asumes complete executive control." These changes 
incorporate the major 1980-1987 findings in this area. 
There was considerable discussion as to whether 
amnesia should be considered a diagnostic criterion for 
MPD. Coons (1980,1984) has argued that it is a prerequi-
site, and the NIMH Research Criteria (Putnam, personal 
communication, 1985) include it. Although amnesia is 
present in some form in the majority of such patients, it 
is generally recognized that it is often denied on inital 
inquiry and only acknowledged later on. Also, many of 
these patients are unaware of their amnesia and conse-
quently cannot report it; they have a variety of selective 
amnesia that KIuft (1985a 1987a) has termed "amnesia 
for amnesia." Also, any of a number of amnestic pat-
terns may prevail (Ellenberger, 1970). Furthermore, 
many traumatized children develop time distortion phe-
nomena rather than frank amnesia (Terr, 1984), and 
K1uft (1985b, 1987a) has pointed to the persistence of 
this phenomenon in many personalities of adult MPD 
patients. Therefore, the inclusion of an amnesia criterion, 
notwithstanding substantial considerations to the 
contrary, was considered likely to contribute to the 
underdiagnosis of such cases. These considerations were 
elaborated in the descriptive text. 
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TEXT 
Recent findings necessitated a massive revision of 
the text. The definitions of "personality" and "personal-
ity state" were explored and explained in context of 
newer information about childhood and extremely 
complex cases of this condition. It was emphasized that 
"approximately half of recently reported cases have ten 
personalities or fewer, and half have over ten (Kluft, 
1984a)." Descriptions of the transition from one person-
ality to another reflected newer awarenesses that the 
transition may be gradual rather than sudden, and may 
be triggered by idiosyncratically meaningful social or 
environmental cues, conflicts or plans among the 
personalities, and therapeutic interventions as well as 
psychosocial stress. The text explicates concisely the 
wide variety of amnestic patterns found among these 
patients, offers an explanation as to why they often are 
unable or unwilling to detail their memory difficulties, 
and clarifies that the several personalities' relationships 
to one another may take a wide variety of forms, which 
in tum influence the clinical manifestations of the 
patient's condition. Where DSM-III had suggested that, 
"The personalities are nearly always quite discrepant 
and frequently seem to be opposites," this reflects an 
outdated and oversimplistic view of the disorder. DSM-
III-R indicates that although this may be found, the 
personalities "May also differ only in alternating ap-
proaches to a major problem area . . . one personality that 
responds to aggression with childlike fright and flight, 
another that responds with masochistic submission, and 
yet another that responds with counterattack." DSM-III-
R does not include the DSM-III note that "Usuallyone of 
the personalities over the course of the disorder is domi-
nant." It reflects a newer awareness that" At different 
times in the person's life, any of the different personali-
ties may vary in the proportion of time that they control 
the person's behavior." This is more consistent with the 
longitudinal course of the disease (Kluft, 1985a). 
The "Associated features" section has been some-
what revised to accommodate itself to the changes noted 
above, and also to address the confusing overlap of 
some of the phenomenology with that of other condi-
tions. It acknowledges, "It is often unclear whether these 
represent coexisting disorders or merely associated 
features of Multiple Personality Disorder." It amends a 
DSM-III statement that suggests that personalities older 
than the actual age of the patient are unusual; such 
personalities, especially among younger patients, are 
commonly observed. It corrects an inaccuracy, that 
transitions are usually dramatic. While this may be true 
when a transition between discrepant personalities 
occurs or is requested in the context of therapy, in fact 
subtle transitions are far more common (KIuft, 1984a). 
Were dramatic transitions the rule, the condition would 
be far more easy to diagnose. The frequency of unnamed! 
personalities and of symbolic and descriptive rather than 
proper names for the personalities is noted in DSM-III-R 
~I 
DSM-III-R 
DSM-III had said that the onset was in early 
childhood or later. DSM-III-R notes that the onset is 
nearly invariably in childh<:><>d, but its recognition is 
much delayed. It reflects longitudinal data (KIuft, 1985a) 
that the frequency of personality switching tends to 
decline with increasing age. Although some optimistic 
outcome studies (KIuft, 1984b, 1986) suggest that a 
statement should be made regarding both "Course" and 
'1mpairment" to correct the rather pessimistic state-
ments regarding chronicity and incomplete recovery 
made in DSM-III, the committee, considering that these 
studies are robust, but, since they represent the work of 
a single investigator, concluded that they should be 
replicated prior to serving as the basis of an optimistic 
replacement statement in DSM-llI-R. The committee 
concluded that the available data suggested that the 
pessimistic statements of DSM-III should be omitted 
without further comment. 
A lay (e.g., Keyes, 1979) and professional (e.g., 
Coons & Milstein, 1986; Kluft, 1987c) literature has 
developed on the "Complications" of Multiple Personal-
ity Disorder. DSM-III-R indicates that self-destructive 
behaviors and externally-directed aggressive acts are 
complications, and that these patients may develop 
Psychoactive Substance Dependence Disorders. In the 
latter case, this often develops as an attempt to palliate 
intense dysphoria and depersonalization. The complica-
tions listed in DSM-III are now considered to be epiphe-
nomena of the manifestations of this condition rather 
than complications. The wording of the "Predisposing 
Factors" section now reflects that studies have docu-
mented the clinical impression that this disorder follows 
upon child abuse or other severe emotional traumata. 
"Prevalence" in DSM-llI read, ''The disorder is appar-
ently extremely rare." Kluft (1987a) has assembled a 
number of reports of large series, including the 100 
patients of Putnam et a1. (1986), the 20 of Coons and 
Milstein (1986), the over 200 of KIuft (1985a), and the 
unpublished raw data on a 355 patient series compiled 
by Schultz, Braun, and Kluft. With thousands of cases 
diagnosed by thousands of mental health workers 
currently in treatment, DSM-III-R notes conservatively 
that, "Recent reports suggest that this disorder is not 
nearly so rare as it has commonly been thought to be." 
DSM-III-R modifies the DSM-III statements on "Sex 
Ratio" to indicate recent series show a female predomi-
nance of from three to nine women to each male, and 
those on "Familial Pattern" to note "that the disorder is 
more common in first-degree biologic relatives of people 
with the disorder than the general population." The 
latter observation is indebted to the anecdotal cross-
generational observations by KIuft (1984c, 1985b), the 
retrospective studies of Braun (1985), and the controlled 
anterospective research of Coons (1985). 
The "Differential Diagnosis" section reflects new 
awareness of the prevalence of Multiple Personalilty 
Disorder of a number of symptoms traditionally associ-
ated with schizophrenia (Kluft, 1987b), and addresses its 
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overlap with Borderline Personality Disorder, both in 
terms of shared features and the possibility of coexistin 
diagnoses (Horevitz & Braun, 1984). It notes the dynam-
ics of the occurrence of complaints of "possession" 
among these patients. DSM-III-R corrects an error in the 
DSM-III discussion of the differential diagnosis with 
malingering. DSM-III is unduly optimistic about the use 
of hypnosis and sodium amobarbit,d in resolving such 
dilemmas, and inadvertantly appears to endorse these 
measures without reservation. In fact, malingerers may 
be able to confuse these diagnostic measures, and, in the 
interim, a literature (reviewed in Kluft, 1987d) has devel 
oped surrounding this troubled and troublesome area. 
The committee concluded that as useful as these meas-
ures often prove to be, their implicit endorsement in 
DSM-III-R would not be appropriate, and the related 
statements were omitted. . 
PSYCHOGENIC FUGUE 
Overview 
In the interval between DSM-III and the delibera-
tions concerning DSM-III-R, few contributions to the 
literature have addressed Psychogenic Fugue (Kluft, 
1988). The committee noted with concern that although 
the criteria for Psychogenic Fugue require the "assump-
tion of a new identity (partial or complete)," and that the 
new literature on Multiple Personality Disorder may 
well have much to contribute to the study of this phe-
nomenon, and raise issues re: the appropriate bounda-
ries of these two disorders, a modern literature on 
Psychogenic Fugue has not developed to facilitate the 
study of these issues. Furthermore, among clinicians, 
there remains considerable misgiving as to whether the 
new identity criterion has merit. Lacking the data to 
resolve these concerns, the committee made only minor 
revisions for this condition, and respected the misgiv-
ings noted by specifying a place within Dissociative 
Disorders NOS for "cases in which sudden unexpected 
travel and organized purposeful behavior with inability 
to recall one's past are not accompanied by the assump-
tion of a new identity, partial or complete." 
Criteria 
Since fugues often occur in other conditions, 
Criterion A. now specifies that ''The predominant 
disturbance is sudden, unexpected travel away from 
home or one's customary place of work, with inabililty 
to recall one's past." Criterion B. remains: ''The assump-
tion of a new identity (partial or complete)." Criterion C. 
has been expanded to reflect an increased awareness 
that what may appear to be Psychogenic Fugue may 
prove to be a manifestaiton of epilepsy or Multiple Per-
sonality Disorder: ''The disturbance is not due to Multi-
ple Personality Disorder or an Organic Mental Disorder 
(e.g., partial complex seizures in temporal lobe epilepsy). 
Text 
The text is largely unrevised with the exception of 
"Differential Diagnosis." Here it is noted that Multiple 
Personality Disorder is characterized by repeated shifts 
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of identity, and often by a history of identity disturbance 
since childhood, whereas in Psychogenic Fugue the 
identity shift usually is limited to a single episode, and 
its onset generally coincides with that of the fugue. 
Also, a caveat is added to indicate that malingerers may 
sustain their behaviors even in the face of hypnosis or 
sodium amobarbarbital interviews. 
PSYCHOGENIC AMNESIA 
Overview 
Between the publication of DSM-III and the delib-
erations concerning DSM-III-R, little has been written 
about clinical amnesia, although the scholarly study of 
experimental paradigms, especially by researchers in the 
field of hypnosis, has been vigorous. Little cross-
fertilization has occurred. Little data has accumulated to 
suggest reason for revision of this disorder's description 
or diagnostic criteria. 
Criteria 
The criteria have been rewritten to clarify that they 
mean to refer to a discrete clinical episode predominated 
by the phenomena of amnesia, and further to alert the 
clinican to rule out Multiple Personality Disorder before 
making this diagnosis. They now read: "A. The pre-
dominant disturbance is an episode of sudden inability 
to recall important personal information that is too 
extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness. B. 
The disturbance is not due to Multiple Personality 
Disorder or to an Organic Mental Disorder (e.g., black-
outs during Alcohol Intoxication)." 
Text 
The text now reflects the change in the criteria, and 
further notes the reservations on the use of hypnosis and 
amy tal that were also described with respect to the 
differential diagnOSiS of Multiple Personality Disorder 
and Psychogenic Fugue. 
DEPERSONALIZATION DISORDER 
Again, a minimal interim literature has developed 
with regard to Depersonalization Disorder (Kluft, 1988). 
There continues to be concern over whether this consi-
tutes a symptom or a syndrome, as many of its stigmata 
are associated with other disorders. Although deperson-
alization is a common symptom, the diagnosis of Deper-
sonalization Disorder is made infrequently. The 
committee reviewed the available literature and reached 
the conclusion that the DSM-III criteria were unduly 
vague and, in their emphasis on the production of 
significant social or occupational functioning, miscon-
strued the predominant thrust of the literature, which 
emphasises more the subjective experiences and per-
sonal distress of those afflicted. It is hoped that the 
result will be a more useful set of criteria that will allow 
the diagnosis to be made more effectively, or conversely, 
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may enable future researchers to determine that it is 
more a disorder or syndrome than a symptom per se. 
Criteria 
DSM-III criteria were: "A. One or more episodes of 
depersonalization sufficient to produce significant 
impairment in social or occupational functioning. B. 
The symptom is not due to any other disorder ... ." DSM-
III-R attempts further clarification and rigor with: "A. 
Persistent or recurrent experiences of depersonalization 
as indicated by either (1) or (2): (1) an experience of 
feeling detached from, and as if one's an outside ob-
server of, one's mental processes or body (2) an experi-
ence of feeling like an automaton or as if in a dream. B. 
During the depersonalization experience, reality testing 
remains intact. C. The depersonalization is sufficiently 
severe and persistent to cause marked distress. D. The 
depersonalization experience is the predominant feature, 
and is not a symptom of another disorder, such as Schiz-
ophrenia, Panic Disorder, or Agoraphobia without His-
tory of Panic Disorder but with limited symptom attacks 
of depersonalization, or temporal lobe epilepsy." The 
thrust toward a more specific definition of the disorder 
and a greater focus on subjective distress is self-evident. 
Text 
The text changes reflect changes in wording that 
better clarify the modified criteria and adopt somewhat 
more readily apprehended terminology and examples. 
Global generalizations of rapid onset and gradual 
remission were mollifed to indicate that these descrip-
tions "usually" prevailed. "Impairment" has been 
changed from "usually minimal" to "minimal to severe," 
which is felt to better reflect the clinical literature. 
Under "Complications" it is now recognized that some 
of these patients develop a Psychoactive Substance 
Abuse Disorder to palliate their distress. Several of the 
''Predisposing Factors" in DSM-III are omitted from 
DSM-III-R, because the committee concluded that these 
factors were more associated with the symptom of 
depersonalization than the development of depersonal-
ization disorder. DSM-III-R indicated that "severe 
stress" may be a predisposing factor, consistent with 
Putnam's findings in a 1985 review. 
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The committee perceived this classification as \ 
extremely important for contemporary psychiatry. It i 
includes a number of disorders characterized by disso-
ciative symptoms, and dissociative symptoms are I 
increasingly recognized as posttraumatic phenomena 1 
(Putnam, 1985; Spiegel, 1985, 1986, in press). I 
Increasingly the victims of terrorism, war, torture I 
will present for treatment, and a failure to appreciate I 





and rehabilitation. As will be discussed below, the 
relationship between the Dissociative Disorders and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder deserves intense study 
and aggressive exploration. Furthermore, this classifica-
tion may encompass many of the manifestations of the 
highly hypnotizable patient, and the study of this group 
of individuals is an exciting area still in its infancy. A 
number of syndromes currently classified elsewhere or 
described in the literature of psychiatric anthropology 
may nest under this heading (Kluft, 1987e). These 
observations reflect the committee's deliberations, but, 
because they are speculative and anticipatory, are not 
reflected in the text. 
Example 
Most of the examples offered in DSM-III-R have 
been noted above or are unchanged from DSM-III. A 
notable exception is the inclusion of "Ganser's syn-
drome: the giving of approximate answers to questions, 
commonly associated with other symptoms such as 
amnesia, disorientation, perceptual disturbances, fugue, 
and conversion symptoms." Ganser's syndrome was 
previously classified as a Factitious Disorder. Between 
DSM-III and the committee's deliberations, Cocores, 
Santa, and Patel (1984) published a review of 41 cases, 
documenting the association of the giving of approxi-
mate answers with the dissociative phenomena noted 
above. At this point in time, it seemed appropriate to 
support this reclassification. 
ALTERATIONS PROPOSED BUT NOT ADOPTED 
A proposal was received that suggested that the 
Dissociative Disorders be reconceptualized as disorders 
of autohypnosis, occurring along a spectrum of degree 
of severity. The committee reviewed the supporting 
data and rejected this proposal on three grounds. First, 
the basis of classification in DSM-III-R is, to as great an 
extent as is possible, phenomenologic rather than 
etiologic. Second, the role of the purported mechanism 
in the formation of some of these disorders has not been 
explored; this is a theory most commonly associated 
with Multiple Personality Disorder (e.g., Bliss, 1986). 
Consequently this type of consideration could not 
become part of the overall text for the Dissociative 
Disorders. Third, this is only one of several conceptuali-
zations currently being proposed to explain some of the 
Dissociative Disorders, none of which has attained gen-
eral acceptance, and all of which remain controversial. 
Proposals were received to create separate classifi-
cations for patients who have syndromes that have the 
same structure as Multiple Personality Disorder, but 
with less overt manifestations, and for children with 
such a condition in its incipient phase (e.g., Fagan and 
McMahon, 1984) or in the process of evolving toward 
the adult form (e.g., Kluft, 1984c, 1985b). The committee 
acknowledged that these conditions exist and have been 
documented, but that at this time the evidence remains 
too preliminary to serve as the basis of new clas.sifica-
tions. Longitudinal data suggests that they may all 
prove to be phases of the same disorder (Kluft, 1985a). 
decision was made to refer to the differences between 
adult and childhood cases in the descriptive text for 
Multiple Personality Disorder, and to include examples 
under Dissociative Disorder NOS that explicitly ac-
knowledged less overtly manifested conditions. 
Proposals were received to create classifications for 
a Possession Disorder, a Trance State Disorder, and a 
combined Trance/Possession Disorder that would be 
diagnosed if either of the above was noted. The commit-
tee acknowledged that a number of patients present 
with trance-like states, but noted that: a) no literature on 
the subject had developed to allow the serious consid-
eration of a new category; and, b) DSM-III had already 
acknowledged such cases under Atypical Dissociative 
Disorder (Dissociative Disorder NOS in DSM-III-R). A 
description of such cases became an example of Disso-
ciative Disorder NOS. With regard to Possession 
Disorder, there was considerable debate, and the 
committee sought the advice of additional consultants. 
Indeed, numerous well-authenticated and extensively 
documented culture-bound dissociative conditions exist 
and are known in the literatures of transcultural psy-
chiatry and anthropological psychiatric inquiry. There 
was little doubt that such a heading would be useful to 
some scientific investigators. However, the large number 
of such syndromes makes their separate listing a logistic 
impossibility. Some concern was expressed that incor-
porating such a disorder might appear to legitimize 
literal demonic possession as a genuine clinical entity, 
prompting consideration of the unwieldy but less 
inflammatory term, Possessioniform Disorder. The 
matter was resolved, after consultation, by a strict 
application of the phenomenologic approach. Most 
possession syndromes are isomorphic with either 
Multiple Personality Disorder, Psychogenic Fugue, or 
examples given under Dissociative Disorder NOS. 
Consequently, pending the development of data that 
would show such a disorder is phenomenologically 
different from these conditions, its addition would be 
redundant. The committee noted that there is a relevant 
historical consideration here. Multiple Personality 
Disorder and its attenuated forms are, historically, the 
secularized descendants of the Judeo-Christian posses-
sion syndrome ( Ellenberger, 1970 ). 
There was considerable discussion regarding the 
possible reclassification of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
from the Anxiety Disorders to the Dissociative Disorder 
section in DSM-III-R. The basis for this proposal was 
that many of the symptoms that occur in Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder are dissociative in nature, and that the 
essential feature of Dissociative Disorders, "a distur-
bance or alteration in the normally integrative functions 
of identity, memory, or consciousness," is operative in 
situations in which the mind is impaired in its capacity 
to contain memories (as well as in its capacity to seques-
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ter memories (amnesia). The cycles of numbing and 
intrusive phenomena (Horowitz, 1986) in Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder are consistent with a dissociative proc-
ess. Furthermore, split identity processes are noted in 
many sufferers Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (Brende, 
1985). A number of scientific investigators have concep-
tualized certain Dissociative Disorders as variants of 
posttraumatic Stress Disorder (KIuft, 1987a; Putnam, 
1985; Spiegel, 1984, 1986). There are thought-provoking 
findings that many veterans suffering Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder have high hypnotizability (Stutman & 
Bliss, 1985; Spiegel, unpublished data) and that Posttrau-
matic Stress Disorder patients score high on the Disso-
ciative Experiences Scale (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986). 
Arguments offered against such a reclassification 
consisted largely of strongly-worded opinions and 
expressions of concern for the non-scientific conse-
quences of such an action. Substantive complaints 
centered around dissatisfactions with the DSM-III and 
DSM-III-R definitions of dissociation (primarily that it is 
too broad), and concerns that little objective data have 
been assembled. The Committee was faced with wide 
differences of opinion. Furthermore, this proposal was 
made at a fairly advanced stage of the revision process, 
and logistic and time pressures made efforts to reach a 
firm resolution on solid scientific grounds difficult. The 
Committee took under consideration that the data 
supporting the proposed changes were relatively new 
and remained to be replicated. The Committee was also 
aware that research already in progress and newer ways 
to conceptualize, describe, and measure dissociation 
were on the horizon (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Braun, 
1988; Sanders, 1986), and that structured interviewing 
instruments to facilitate the more objective study of the 
Dissociative Disorders will soon be available, (e.g., 
Steinberg, Howland, & Cicchetti, 1986; Heber et al., 1987; 
Dyke & Gillette, 1987). Anticipating that scientific 
advances in the near future are likely to explore and 
resolve the areas currently regarded as problematic, the 
Committee and the Work Group decided against a 
reclassification at this point in time, and suggested that 
the same issue could be approached with more data 
during the deliberations for DSM IV. 
DISSCUSSION 
The Dissociative Disorders are the subject of 
considerable contemporary clinical and research interest, 
but their study is a relatively new field of inquiry. The 
committee attempted to incorporate the most reliable 
and valid insights of the newer clinical and research 
findings and the most cogent feedback from a wide 
variety of sources. It is anticipated that the DSM-III-R 
criteria and text will require additional revision as 
psychiatry further explores this group of conditions. 
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